Insights

In 2004 an American psychologist by the name of Barry Schwartz wrote a book called The Paradox of Choice. His central premise was that excessive consumer choice leads to worse consumer outcomes than we commonly assume. Too many types and brands of cereal, for example, overwhelm our innate to rationally sort preferences and arrive a choice that maximizes our happiness. More turns out to be less (hence the paradox).

The results of subsequent field studies on choice-induced anxiety have been rather mixed. And for their part, retailers have ignored the book completely, only further specializing their products. Just look at the rise of microbreweries and even niche soft drinks. Consumers clearly have an interest in having their tastes catered to the most minute detail. Schwartz’s thesis, then, would seem to be on pretty shaky ground.

One exception to the uncertainty is military procurement. If anything, debacles like Canada’s long tortured purchase of navy ships and F-35 fighter jets have illustrated just how tight in knots procurement officials can tie themselves, dancing around the tiniest of specifications as competing bids make their way through the competition process. Add to this the demand for local economic spinoffs and its a wonder anything ever gets built.

This would all be an exercise in needless waste if today’s war in Ukraine did not show just how useless—and in fact dangerous—such an exercise is. The chief lesson emanating out of that struggle is that it does not really matter *which* combat widget you buy, you just need an off-the-shelf capability that exists in large numbers. A competent force structure—good senior leadership and junior officers, exhaustive training or use of the gear, and effective combined arms integration—will be sure to put them to good use.

The lesson, to reiterate, is that dithering over specs is all for naught. In war the enemy will adapt. Scores of our equipment will be blown up. What matters most is therefore buying proven platforms that solve specific needs—and then to have a plan on how we can get more if we need, including all the ammunition and supplies used up by their use. We have, in other words, been doing military procurement all wrong.